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Insecurity by Design: Today’s IoT Device Security Problem
Maire O’Neill
Research Director, Secure Digital Systems at the Center for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT), Queen’s University Belfast
In today’s technological age someone could gain access to 
your online bank account through a light bulb. This is due to the 
Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT has become a reality as more and 
more of our devices are being connected to the Internet. In fact, 
automated teller machines (ATMs) have been online for many 
years, and more recently we have had the installation of smart 
meters remotely connecting to the electricity grid. We now have 
smart watches and smart baby monitors, and there are many 
more examples of new IoT devices.
The influence of IoT in our day to day activities is set to further 
increase with a projected 25 billion connected devices by 2020, 
according to Gartner [1], while Cisco believes that by 2020, 50 bil-
lion devices will be network-connected [2]. Gartner also predicts 
that the automotive industry will show the highest growth rate 
in connected things as car-to-car communication and self-driving 
car technology begin to become commonplace. Smart devices and 
sensors will be found in our homes, our cars, our workplaces, in 
remote health sensing, and in self-driving cars. IoT has the poten-
tial to truly revolutionize how we interact with the world today.
1.  Challenges
The expected volume of connected devices necessitates the 
use of machine-to-machine communication meaning that we 
will no longer have direct control over with whom or what our 
devices are communicating. In addition, the growing presence 
of devices enables new attack methods and new attack surfaces 
for criminals and hackers to exploit, posing serious security and 
privacy issues. Practical attacks of IoT devices have already been 
shown to be a real threat. Returning to the light-bulb example, in 
2014, security experts demonstrated how they could hack a lead-
ing brand of network-connected light bulb and obtain the Wi-
Fi username and password of the household to which the lights 
were connected [3]. Attacks have also been shown against smart 
meters, home automation devices, and in 2015 Chrysler had to 
send out a security update to all its customers after a live demo 
showed how to remotely cut the engine and take control of the 
steering and brakes of their cars via its network-connected enter-
tainment system [4]. It is very evident that the fact these devices 
are network-connected poses serious threats, which could have 
significant real-world consequences. This is one of the many chal-
lenges in providing IoT device security. 
Compounding this problem is the fact that to enable the 
ubiquitous nature of the IoT, the embedded devices themselves 
are often low-cost, low power devices that are restricted in both 
memory and computing power, and adversaries will have physi-
cal access to the devices. As such, physical attacks are possible in-
cluding side-channel attacks (SCAs), which can be used to extract 
the secret key from electronic devices using power, electromag-
netic (EM) emanations, timing analysis or acoustics. Such attacks 
have been shown against transit cards [5], car immobilisers [6], 
and Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device bitstreams [7].
Quantum computers may also have a significant impact on to-
day’s security. Public-key cryptography, which is an essential ele-
ment in security applications today, is used to secure everything 
from email to online transactions. However, it is computationally 
intensive and expensive to implement. It is also believed that it 
will no longer be secure due to the computational capabilities of 
quantum computing. For example, the RSA algorithm is based on 
the integer factorization problem and quantum computers are 
expected to be able to factorize large numbers at an exponen-
tial speedup over today’s classical computers. Quantum-safe or 
post-quantum cryptography refers to conventional non-quantum 
cryptographic algorithms that are secure today but will remain se-
cure even after practical quantum computing is a reality. They are 
based on different underlying hard problems to current public- 
key techniques. In August 2015, the National Security Agency 
announced that the Suite B cryptographic algorithms as specified 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will 
be transitioning to quantum-resistant algorithms in light of the 
potential threat of quantum computers [8].
2.  How can we address these challenges?
So how can we address these challenges? There are many new 
security technologies and solutions currently being developed 
that can help to address IoT device security problems. These in-
clude quantum-safe algorithms which I have already mentioned; 
however, in many cases they are not practical and many are even 
more complex than current public-key techniques. Also, their key 
sizes tend to be much larger, making them impractical for low-
cost devices. The development of practical and optimal quantum- 
safe solutions is very much an open research problem at the 
moment.
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There are a number of initiatives currently addressing this, 
including workshops being hosted by NIST in the US, and by the 
European standardisation body, European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI). There are also European H2020 funded 
projects including the SAFEcrypto project [9]. Work has already 
been carried out in this project to show that it is possible to 
achieve light weight quantum-safe solutions [9].
An alternative approach for providing device authentication, 
in particular, is the utilization of a physical unclonable function 
(PUF). PUFs use the manufacturing process variations of silicon 
chips to generate a unique digital fingerprint. Since every chip 
is different, no two chips give the same response when supplied 
with the same challenge. This allows the use of PUF technology 
for both device identification and authentication. They also have 
the advantage of being tamper resistant and as such can be uti-
lized to detect cloned devices. They are inherently lightweight, 
with a recently proposed PUF solution (Fig. 1) occupying less than 
1% on a low-cost FPGA device [10]. As such, they can be used as 
an effective trust anchor to enable lightweight device authentica-
tion in embedded IoT systems.
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Fig. 1.  One-bit physical unclonable function (PUF) identification generator cell 
design.
3.  Conclusions 
In conclusion, as companies race to get IoT devices to market, 
many are forgetting about security or all too often, security is an 
afterthought. Numerous attacks of IoT devices have already been 
demonstrated, and these attacks could have significant conse-
quences. Therefore, it is vital that companies take the time to 
consider the security of their devices and include appropriate se-
curity solutions, such as PUF and quantum-safe techniques, from 
the outset of their design.
Finally, the security of IoT devices can be regarded as just one 
Fig. 2.  IoT ecosystem.
layer of the IoT ecosystem (Fig. 2). A second layer is the commu-
nications between the devices, the security of which is also vital; 
and thirdly, the amount of data being generated from such a vol-
ume of devices must also be stored and analyzed securely. There-
fore, a step change in the security and privacy of all layers of the 
IoT ecosystem is needed to ensure its usability and acceptance in 
the future, with secure IoT devices at the root.
